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ALIEN TORT LITIGATION:
THE ROAD NOT TAKEN
William S. Dodge *
INTRODUCTION
When the Second Circuit decided in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala1 that the Alien
Tort Statute (ATS) provided a federal forum for international human rights
claims, no one would have predicted that thirty-three years later in Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.2 the Supreme Court would use the presumption
against extraterritoriality to limit those claims.3 This Essay recounts some of
the doctrinal developments in alien tort litigation during the intervening
thirty-three years.4
After Filartiga, courts faced a choice whether to apply international law
as the rule of decision or the law of the place where the tort occurred.
Courts chose the international law road, with U.S. law providing the cause of
action and the rules for damages. The Supreme Court ratified this choice in
 2014 William S. Dodge. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Professor of Law, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law. I should disclose that I have played a role in a number of the
cases discussed in this essay. As a law student, I was on the brief for the plaintiffs in Paul v.
Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993). I wrote the Brief of Professors of Federal
Jurisdiction and Legal History as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, which the
Supreme Court followed in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004). I joined the
Brief of Amici Curiae International Law Scholars in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees in
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007). And as Counselor on
International Law to the Legal Adviser at the State Department from 2011 to 2012, I
worked on the briefs for the United States as amicus curiae in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). The views expressed here are my own. My thanks to Bill Casto,
Scott Dodson, Chimène Keitner, and Beth Stephens for comments on an earlier draft.
1 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
2 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
3 Cf. Eugene Kontorovich, Kiobel Surprise: Unexpected by Scholars but Consistent with
International Trends, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1671 (2014) (suggesting that the legal academy chose to ignore the question).
4 For an excellent account of alien tort litigation in a broader historical and doctrinal
context, see Beth Stephens, The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1467 (2014).
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Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,5 clarifying that the cause of action came not from the
ATS itself but from federal common law. In the battles over aiding and abetting liability that followed, plaintiffs argued that federal common law should
govern just about every issue of ATS litigation except the initial violation of
international law, while defendants and the Bush Administration argued that
the presumption against extraterritoriality should apply to the federal common law cause of action, the position the Supreme Court accepted in Kiobel.
It appears in hindsight that the early decisions to apply international law
rather than the lex loci delicti as the rule of decision in alien tort litigation
ultimately provided the doctrinal hook for the Supreme Court to restrict
alien tort suits with the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Certainly there were reasons to choose international law over foreign
domestic law at the time.6 Once alien tort litigation had started down the
international law road, there were paths that might have skirted the extraterritoriality question more easily.7 And it is possible that the Roberts Court
would have found another doctrine to restrict alien tort suits had different
choices been made.8 Choices are inevitable in litigation as in life. The purpose of this Essay is to explore the doctrinal consequences of the choices that
were made and to glance briefly down the road not taken.
I.

FILARTIGA

AND THE

CHOICE

OF

LAW

Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,
And sorry I could not travel both
And be one traveler, long I stood
And looked down one as far as I could
To where it bent in the undergrowth;9
The era of human rights litigation in U.S. courts began in 1980 with the
Second Circuit’s decision in Filartiga.10 Joel and Dolly Filártiga, the father
and sister of Joelito Filártiga, brought suit in U.S. district court against Americo Peña-Irala, a Paraguayan police inspector who overstayed his visa in the
United States.11 They alleged that Peña-Irala had tortured Joelito to death in
retaliation for his father Joel’s political activities.12 On appeal, the Second
Circuit held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under the
Alien Tort Statute, which provides original jurisdiction over “any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
5 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
6 See infra notes 105–27 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 188–93, 218–23, and accompanying text.
8 Cf. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753-63 (2014) (dismissing ATS suit for
lack of general jurisdiction over parent corporation).
9 ROBERT FROST, The Road Not Taken, in MOUNTAIN INTERVAL 9 (1931).
10 For a comprehensive account of the Filartiga case, see WILLIAM J. ACEVES, THE ANATOMY OF TORTURE (2007).
11 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878–79 (2d Cir. 1980).
12 Id. at 879.
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treaty of the United States.”13 Clearly, the Filártigas were aliens and torture
is a tort. Supported by a memorandum filed by the U.S. government,14 the
Second Circuit also held that official torture was a violation of customary
international law.15 While this holding was sufficient to satisfy the statute,
subject matter jurisdiction for federal courts also requires a basis in Article III
of the Constitution, which the Second Circuit found in Article III’s grant of
jurisdiction over cases “arising under . . . the Laws of the United States.”16
“The constitutional basis for the Alien Tort Statute is the law of nations,
which has always been part of the federal common law.”17
The Filartiga court emphasized that it was only deciding the question of
subject matter jurisdiction and not “the issue of the choice of law to be
applied, which will be addressed at a later stage in the proceedings.”18 In
arguing for dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens, the defendant
Peña-Irala claimed that Paraguayan law provided a civil remedy for the wrong
alleged.19 The court of appeals also discussed at some length the doctrine of
transitory tort,20 a doctrine under which a tortfeasor could be sued wherever
he was found, but generally under the lex loci delicti—the law of the place
where the tort occurred.21 Indeed, the court even suggested that “the dis13 Id. at 880 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976)).
14 Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876 (No.
79-6090), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585 (1980).
15 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880–85.
16 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
17 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885.
18 Id. at 889. In an earlier ATS case arising in Cuba during the Spanish-American War,
the district court assumed that the lex loci delicti applied, see O’Reilly De Camara v. Brooke,
135 F. 384, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1905) (quoting the Spanish Civil Code), but dismissed the suit on
the ground that the defendant’s actions had been ratified by the United States. See
O’Reilly De Camara v. Brooke, 142 F. 858, 861–63 (S.D.N.Y. 1906), aff’d, 209 U.S. 45
(1908).
19 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 879 & n.5. Plaintiffs’ complaint had made no claims under
Paraguayan law. See Verified Complaint, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (No. 79 C 917), reprinted in ACEVES, supra note 10, at 215.
20 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885.
21 See Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B.) 1029 (noting in a transitory
tort case that “whatever is a justification in the place where the thing is done, ought to be a
justification where the cause is tried”). Transitory tort actions filed in U.S. state courts
almost always apply the lex loci delicti. See Patrick J. Borchers, Conflict-of-Laws Considerations
in State Court Human Rights Actions, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 45, 50 (2013) (“[U]nless the
defendants choose not to raise the choice-of-law issue—which would result in the application of forum law—the law of the foreign country where the actions took place will surely
apply.” (footnote omitted)); see also Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, Two Myths
About the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1609, 1638 (2014) (“[T]he First Congress expected municipal (i.e., domestic) law, rather than international law, to govern in
ATS cases.”); Thomas H. Lee, The Three Lives of the Alien Tort Statute: The Evolving Role of the
Judiciary in U.S. Foreign Relations, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1645, 1652 (2014) (“[T]he legal
norms the First Congress had in mind when enacting the ATS were not protean international law norms, but rather the domestic law of tort . . . .”). In other countries, courts also
typically apply foreign domestic law to claims that might be brought under the ATS in the
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trict court may well decide that fairness requires it to apply Paraguayan law to
the instant case.”22 But ultimately, the court of appeals left it to the district
court to decide whether to apply the law of Paraguay or international law as
the rule of decision.23
The law applicable in ATS cases was widely acknowledged to be an open
question after Filartiga.24 We can get a sense of what the two doctrinal roads
looked like at that time from two early and influential law review articles.25
In a piece published the year after Filartiga, Jeffrey Blum and Ralph Steinhardt described the choice of law question this way:
Once jurisdiction is sustained, the question emerges of how to conceptualize the cause of action: do plaintiffs sue for torture under the law of
nations as incorporated into United States common law, or is the cause of
action wrongful death under the law of the situs, with international law having relevance only for clearing the jurisdictional hurdle?26

Blum and Steinhardt looked first at the traditional option of applying the lex
loci delicti in transitory tort cases. Determining the content of foreign tort law
United States. See, e.g., Rb. The Hague 30 januari 2013, Case No.: C/09/337050 / HA ZA
09-1580, at ¶ 4.9 (Akpan/Royal Dutch Shell PLC) (Neth.) (holding that Nigerian law governed environmental tort claims against Royal Dutch Shell); Rb. The Hague 21 maart
2012, Case No.: 400882 / HA ZA 11-2252, at ¶ 2.3 (El-Hojouj/Derbal) (Neth.) (awarding
damages for torture under Libyan law); Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals PLC, [2009] EWHC
2475 (QB), [¶ 10] (describing claims of corporate responsibility for torture under Peruvian law). See generally Michael D. Goldhaber, Corporate Human Rights Litigation in Non-U.S.
Courts: A Comparative Scorecard, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 127 (2013) (discussing human rights
litigation against corporations in other countries). For useful summaries of the avenues
for bringing human rights claims in other legal systems, see Supplemental Brief of Yale
Law School Center for Global Legal Challenges as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at 28–40, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491); Beth
Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2002); Robert C. Thompson et al., Translating Unocal: The Expanding Web of Liability for Business Entities Implicated in
International Crimes, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 841 (2009).
22 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889 n.25.
23 See infra notes 107–15 and accompanying text.
24 See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 804 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring) (“If jurisdiction rested on section 1350, there are three arguable
theories about what law would supply the rule of decision. The rule of decision might be
the international law (treaty or customary international law) violated; it might be a federal
common law of torts; or it might be the tort law of whatever jurisdiction applicable choice
of law principles would point to.”); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 862 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (“We must now face the issue left open by the Court of Appeals, namely, the nature
of the ‘action’ over which the section affords jurisdiction.”). As late as 2000, the Second
Circuit would say that “the federal courts have never definitively resolved this choice-of-law
question.” Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 105 n.12 (2d Cir. 2000).
25 Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human
Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 22 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53
(1981); William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467 (1986).
26 Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 25, at 57.
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was no obstacle, for this is something federal courts do routinely in choice of
law cases.27 But two other problems gave them pause. The first had to do
with immunities. If a federal court were to apply the lex loci delicti, they reasoned, it would have to apply that law “in its entirety,” which meant that “[a]
foreign state could thus shield its officials who violated core human rights by
enacting very broad immunities for government officials.”28 The second
problem had to do with Article III jurisdiction. “[I]t might be argued that, if
the substantive law of the situs defines the cause of action, federal courts
cannot constitutionally hear the case under article III, since it does not ‘arise
under’ the Constitution or the laws or treaties of the United States.”29 The
less travelled road was “to apply international law as it has been incorporated
into the federal common law.”30 This, Blum and Steinhardt suggested,
would solve the Article III problem31 and “negate[ ] the ability of foreign
governments to immunize their officers who violate human rights norms.”32
Writing in 1986, which was still early but after the district court’s decision on remand in Filartiga and the D.C. Circuit’s split decision in Tel-Oren,33
William Casto saw the two roads somewhat differently. He divided the possibility of applying international law as federal common law into two options—
applying international law directly or fashioning federal common law remedies for violations of international law—but found neither attractive.34 “Most
of the current litigation arises out of incidents between aliens in foreign
countries, and doubt exists whether United States domestic law can or should
be used to regulate these incidents. Likewise it is questionable whether private tort remedies are available under international law.”35 This left “foreign
domestic law.”36 While Casto agreed with Blum and Steinhardt that foreign
27 See id. at 98 (“Proving the content of the law of the situs generally poses few conceptual or procedural difficulties.”).
28 Id. But see Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise of Filartiga: Litigating Human
Rights Claims Against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 65, 95 (1995)
(“[C]hoice of law analysis need not yield a single body of law to govern every issue in a
case.”).
29 Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 25, at 98.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 99 (“The incorporation of the law of nations into federal common law, which
the court of appeals was careful to demonstrate, means that Filartiga-like claims do ‘arise
under’ the laws of the United States, within the meaning of article III.”).
32 Id. at 101; see also Richard A. Conn, Jr., Note, The Alien Tort Statute: International Law
as the Rule of Decision, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 874, 885 (1981) (“The policy interest of the
international community may . . . be inadequately reflected in the domestic laws of an
interested jurisdiction.”).
33 See infra notes 85–115 and accompanying text.
34 See Casto, supra note 25, at 471–86.
35 Id. at 471–72 (footnotes omitted); see also Gordon A. Christenson, The Uses of
Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpretation, 4 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 39, 46 (1981)
(“The lex delecti should not be displaced by using the human rights law against torture as
the rule of decision unless the lex delicti so departs from these human rights norms that it
would upset the peace of nations to apply it.”).
36 Casto, supra note 25, at 487.
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law might include limitations on recovery, including doctrines of immunity,37 he was less troubled by the constitutional question. “Constitutional
authority for a grant of jurisdiction to try aliens’ claims created by foreign law
is justifiable under a theory of protective jurisdiction.”38 If Congress had the
constitutional authority to pass legislation for human rights cases that affect
the United States’ foreign relations, it might take the lesser step of committing these cases to the federal courts and providing that they be governed by
foreign law.39
With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to evaluate some of these
initial worries. The concern that choosing foreign law might obligate a U.S.
court to apply foreign immunity doctrines appears to have been unfounded.
In the 1940s, the Supreme Court had adopted a policy of deferring to the
executive branch on questions of state immunity,40 a position of deference
that some lower courts extended to questions of foreign official immunity.41
In 1976, Congress codified the rules with respect to foreign states in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).42 Although a number of lower courts
applied the FSIA to alien tort suits against foreign officials,43 the Supreme
Court made clear in Samantar v. Yousuf 44 that the immunity of foreign officials “is properly governed by the common law.”45 At the time Filartiga was
decided, the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law summarized the common law as providing official immunity for heads of state, heads of government, foreign ministers, and “any other public minister, official, or agent of
the state with respect to acts performed in his official capacity if the effect of
exercising jurisdiction would be to enforce a rule of law against the state.”46
For present purposes, the key point is that none of these authorities provided
37 Id. at 487 n.110.
38 Id. at 512.
39 See id. at 512–25; see also Michael Danaher, Case Comment, Torture as a Tort in Violation of International Law: Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 33 STAN. L. REV. 353, 357 (1981) (“An alternative constitutional theory, ‘protective jurisdiction’—coupled with a cause of action
drawn from traditional choice of law analysis—may provide a civil remedy for victims of
torture without relying on an unnecessary expansion of international law.”). On protective
jurisdiction generally, see Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53
COLUM. L. REV. 157, 184–96 (1953); Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of
the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 224–25 (1948).
40 See Republic of Mex. v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318
U.S. 578 (1943).
41 See Greenspan v. Crosbie, No. 74 Civ. 4734 (GLG), 1976 WL 841, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 23, 1976).
42 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611 (2006 & Supp. V).
43 See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467, 1469–72
(9th Cir. 1994) (holding that former Philippine president was not entitled to immunity
under the FSIA because acts of torture, execution, and disappearance were outside of his
official authority).
44 560 U.S. 305 (2010).
45 Id. at 325.
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 66 (1965).
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that the immunity of a foreign official from suit in U.S. court would be determined by foreign law.47
The concern about Article III jurisdiction was more serious. Because
Article III’s grant of alienage jurisdiction does not reach cases where both
parties are aliens,48 the only possible basis for Article III jurisdiction in a case
like Filartiga would be the “arising under” grant. The Second Circuit had
found “arising under” jurisdiction based on the assumption that “the law of
nations . . . has always been part of the federal common law.”49 The problem
with this solution is that, at least until Erie, the law of nations was considered
to be part of general common law, not federal common law.50 The better
answer is that the law of nations, though part of general common law, was
nevertheless considered part of the “Laws of the United States” as that phrase
is used in Article III.51 This interpretation makes sense of the difference in
47 Conflicts principles would also have allowed the application of U.S. law to questions
of immunity. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971) (“The rights
and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law
of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. cmt. d (noting that the law governing
acceptable conduct might be different from the law governing immunity). A related concern might have been foreign amnesty laws, see BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 122 (1996) (noting this possibility),
but a U.S. court could decline to apply such a law on public policy grounds. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(b) (noting a court may consider “the relevant
policies of the forum”); cf. id. § 90 (“No action will be entertained on a foreign cause of
action the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong public policy of the forum.”).
Finally, foreign statutes of limitations might have barred some claims. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142 (1986) (claim may be barred by statute of limitations
of state other than the forum). But until federal courts began to apply the Torture Victim
Protection Act’s ten-year statute of limitations in ATS cases, see Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.
Supp. 162, 192–93 (D. Mass. 1995) (“Plaintiffs’ claims also are timely under the most analogous federal statute, the TVPA, which contains a ten year statute of limitations.”), it was not
at all clear that foreign statutes of limitations would be less favorable than the U.S. one.
See, e.g., Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1547–51 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that
California’s one-year limitation applied, rather than Argentina’s two-year rule).
48 See Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809); Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12, 14 (1800).
49 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (1980).
50 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 824 (1997) (“During this
period, the law of nations . . . had the legal status of general common law.” (footnote
omitted)); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347,
2354 (1991) (“But throughout the early nineteenth century, American courts regularly
construed and applied the unwritten law of nations as part of the ‘general common law,’
particularly to resolve commercial disputes, without regard to whether it should be characterized as federal or state.”).
51 William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations on
Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 687, 701–11 (2002); see also Anthony D’Amato, The Alien
Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 62, 65 (1988) (noting that
jurisdiction to hear ATS claims between two aliens is provided “by the ‘Arising Under’
clause of Article III”); William A. Fletcher, International Human Rights in American Courts, 93
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language between Articles III and VI of the Constitution,52 is supported by
the purpose of the delegates at the Philadelphia Convention to create a federal judiciary with jurisdiction over all questions under the law of nations,
and is consistent with the understanding of the state ratifying conventions.53
Blum and Steinhardt suggested that the Article III problem could be
solved by reading the ATS as a grant of authority “to create a federal common law of torts to give effect to the purposes of international norms,”54 a
possibility supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama.55 They were more skeptical that Article III jurisdiction would exist if foreign law were applied to the merits.56 Casto, on the
other hand, thought that courts could apply foreign domestic law and still
solve the Article III problem with a theory of protective jurisdiction,57
VA. L. REV. 653, 656 (2007) (noting that Oliver Ellsworth, who drafted the ATS, “may also
have believed that the law of nations was federal law in the jurisdiction-conferring sense”);
Michael D. Ramsey, International Law as Part of Our Law: A Constitutional Perspective, 29 PEPP.
L. REV. 187, 204 (2001) (“[T]o argue that international law is nonpreemptive U.S. law—
i.e., it is encompassed by Article III but not by Article VI[—] . . . fits comfortably within
constitutional text, structure, and practice.”). But see Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 597–616 (2002) (arguing that the law of nations is
not part of the laws of the United States under Article III).
52 Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . .” (emphasis added)), with id. art.
VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .” (emphasis added)).
53 See Dodge, supra note 51, at 705–09 (considering evidence from the Constitutional
Convention and ratification debates).
54 Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 25, at 98.
55 353 U.S. 448, 456–57 (1957) (reading § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 to authorize a federal common law of labor relations). In Filartiga, the Second
Circuit had considered this theory but found it unnecessary to adopt it. See Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that “such a reading [of the ATS] is
possible”). Two subsequent decisions relied explicitly on Lincoln Mills. See Abebe-Jira v.
Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Congress, of course, may enact a statute that
confers on the federal courts jurisdiction over a particular class of cases while delegating to
the courts the task of fashioning remedies that give effect to the federal policies underlying
the statute.” (citing Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448)); In re Estate of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. 1460,
1469 (D. Haw. 1995) (“Because Congress in the TVPA offered no methodology as to how
damages should be determined, federal courts are free to and should create federal common law to provide justice for any injury contemplated by the Alien Tort Statute and the
TVPA or treaties dealing with the protection of human rights.” (citing Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. at 457)).
56 See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 25, at 98 (“[I]t might be argued that, if the substantive law of the situs defines the cause of action, federal courts cannot constitutionally
hear the case under article III, since it does not ‘arise under’ the Constitution or the laws
or treaties of the United States.”); supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
57 See Casto, supra note 25, at 512–25 (discussing the theory of protective jurisdiction);
supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
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although the Supreme Court has never relied on such a theory to support
subject matter jurisdiction.58
But a solution simpler than both of these presented itself just three years
after Filartiga, when the Supreme Court decided Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank
of Nigeria.59 In Verlinden, a Dutch corporation sued the Central Bank of Nigeria for anticipatory breach of a letter of credit.60 Both parties were aliens,61
as in a typical ATS suit, and the law governing the merits of the dispute was
not federal.62 The Court relied on Chief Justice Marshall’s “broad conception of ‘arising under’ jurisdiction, according to which Congress may confer
on the federal courts jurisdiction over any case or controversy that might call
for the application of federal law.”63 Because the FSIA codified the law of
foreign state immunity, the Court concluded that “a suit against a foreign
state under this Act necessarily raises questions of substantive federal law at
the very outset, and hence clearly ‘arises under’ federal law, as that term is
used in Article III.”64
Given that the law of nations is part of the “Laws of the United States”
for Article III purposes,65 precisely the same thing must be said about suits
brought under the ATS: a suit under the ATS necessarily raises a question of
U.S. law—whether there has been a tort in violation of the law of nations—at
the very outset, and hence arises under U.S. law even if, as in Verlinden, the
law governing the merits is non-federal law. The only possible difference
between Verlinden and a typical ATS case is that the FSIA enumerates rules
for state immunity,66 while the ATS incorporates the law of nations by refer58 Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 137 (1989) (“We have, in the past, not found the
need to adopt a theory of ‘protective jurisdiction’ to support Art. III ‘arising under’ jurisdiction, and we do not see any need for doing so here because we do not recognize any
federal interests that are not protected by limiting removal to situations in which a federal
defense is alleged.” (citation omitted)).
59 461 U.S. 480 (1983). The Second Circuit’s decision in Verlinden was written by
Judge Kaufman, who also wrote the opinion in Filartiga. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank
of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320, 321 (2d Cir. 1981), rev’d, 461 U.S. 480 (1983); Filartiga, 630 F.2d
at 877. In Verlinden, Judge Kaufman held that Article III jurisdiction was lacking because
the issue of sovereign immunity was an affirmative defense rather than part of the plaintiff’s case, 647 F.2d at 326–27, but the Supreme Court reversed. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 497;
see infra notes 60–64 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in
Verlinden).
60 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 482–83.
61 See id. at 482 (noting the Dutch and Nigerian nationalities of the parties).
62 The sales contract was governed by Dutch law. Id. The opinion does not make
clear what law governed the letter of credit, though both parties agreed that the letter had
incorporated by reference the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits, a
source of trade custom. See id. at 482–83 & n.3.
63 Id. at 492 (citing Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 818, 822
(1824)).
64 Id. at 493.
65 See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
66 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611 (2006 & Supp. V).
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ence.67 But the Supreme Court long ago rejected the proposition that Congress must create law by enumeration rather than by reference. In United
States v. Smith,68 the Court upheld a federal statute punishing “the crime of
piracy, as defined by the law of nations.”69 “Congress may as well define by
using a term of a known and determinate meaning, as by an express enumeration of all the particulars included in that term.”70 Thus, by 1983 at the
latest, it should have been clear that Article III created no obstacle to ATS
suits irrespective of whether the law applied to the merits was international
law incorporated as federal common law or foreign law.71
As noted above, Casto favored applying foreign domestic law because he
thought it inappropriate to apply U.S. law.72 “Most of the current litigation
arises out of incidents between aliens in foreign countries, and doubt exists
whether United States domestic law can or should be used to regulate these
incidents.”73 Even if the rule of decision were taken from international law,
he reasoned, “the remedy would be a creature of a particular sovereign—the
United States.”74 Although the remedy for constitutional torts under Bivens75 offered a model for the development of tort remedies,76 Casto thought
there would be “special factors counseling hesitation”77 in recognizing remedies under U.S. law for violations of international law in other countries.78
While Casto expressed concern about applying U.S. law in ATS cases, he
did not express that concern in terms of the presumption against extraterri67 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
68 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
69 Id. at 157 (internal quotation marks omitted).
70 Id. at 159.
71 The Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659
(2013), finally establishes that Article III jurisdiction exists over ATS suits between two
aliens. Although the Court may decide certain threshold issues before establishing that it
has subject matter jurisdiction, see Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549
U.S. 422, 425 (2007) (holding that a court may decide a forum non conveniens motion
before determining personal or subject matter jurisdiction), extraterritorial scope “is a
merits question,” Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010), which
the Court could not have reached in Kiobel unless it had jurisdiction under Article III.
Much the same thing could have been said after Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692
(2004). See Fletcher, supra note 51, at 664 (“[T]he Court’s decision necessarily implies
that the federal common law of customary international law is jurisdiction conferring.”).
But because Sosa also involved a claim against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claim Act, supplemental jurisdiction might alternatively have supported the ATS claim.
See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
72 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
73 Casto, supra note 25, at 471 (footnotes omitted).
74 Id. at 474–75, 477.
75 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 390–97 (1971).
76 Casto, supra note 25, at 481.
77 Id. at 482 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396).
78 See id. at 481–86. For Casto’s post-Sosa views on the applicable law, see infra notes
188–93 and accompanying text.
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toriality.79 In the 1980s, it would have seemed highly unlikely that the
Supreme Court would apply that presumption to the ATS. Although that
presumption against extraterritoriality has a long history in American law, by
the time Filartiga was decided it had largely fallen out of use.80 The Supreme
Court did not fully revive the presumption until its 1991 decision in
Aramco,81 and while the Court’s decisions since then have not been entirely
consistent, the presumption against extraterritoriality has been applied with
much greater frequency.82 Even after the presumption’s revival, its applicability to alien tort litigation was not obvious. The ATS is a jurisdictional statute, and the Court has not typically applied the presumption against
extraterritoriality to jurisdictional statutes.83 Moreover, the presumption certainly does not apply to customary international law, which by definition is
binding everywhere. But as U.S. courts increasingly looked to federal law to
create a cause of action and to fashion remedies in ATS cases, the presumption would become more and more of a threat.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW

AS THE

RULE

OF

DECISION

Then took the other, as just as fair,
And having perhaps the better claim,
Because it was grassy and wanted wear;
Though as for that the passing there
Had worn them really about the same,84
The doctrinal road that alien tort litigation took was to apply international law as the rule of decision, with U.S. law providing the cause of action
and the rules for damages. The choice was influenced by the claims that
plaintiffs decided to bring. In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,85 the first sig79
80

See supra notes 72–78 and accompanying text.
See William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 85–86 (1998).
81 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). The Court had
also applied the presumption two years earlier in Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping
Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440–41 (1989).
82 See William S. Dodge, Loose Canons: International Law and Statutory Interpretation in the
Twenty-First Century, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 547 (David L. Sloss,
Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge eds., 2011).
83 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (applying the
presumption to the substantive, but not the jurisdictional, provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act). The two cases in which the Supreme Court has applied the presumption
against extraterritoriality to arguably jurisdictional statutes both involved statutes that codified rules of immunity, which may be characterized as substantive. See Smith v. United
States, 507 U.S. 197, 203–04 (1993) (interpreting the Federal Tort Claims Act); Amerada
Hess, 488 U.S. at 440–41 (interpreting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). For further
discussion, see William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality After Morrison,
105 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 396, 399 (2011).
84 FROST, supra note 9, at 9.
85 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981), aff’d, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-4\NDL403.txt

1588

unknown

Seq: 12

notre dame law review

8-MAY-14

9:21

[vol. 89:4

nificant ATS case decided after Filartiga, representatives of the victims of a
Palestine Liberation Organization terrorist attack brought claims under treaties, customary international law, and U.S. criminal statutes, but no claims
under the laws of Israel, where the attack occurred.86 Plaintiffs claimed subject matter jurisdiction not just under the ATS87 but also under § 1331, the
general “federal question” statute,88 because some of the plaintiffs were U.S.
citizens whose claims the ATS did not cover.89 The invocation of § 1331 led
the district court to focus on the existence of a cause of action, which it
found lacking with respect to U.S. criminal statutes, treaties, and customary
international law.90 The court rejected the claim that federal common law
provided a cause of action for violations of the law of nations, reasoning that
the requirement for a cause of action was “no less compelling” for customary
international law than for treaties, and that “[t]o permit plaintiffs to assert
under § 1331 claims under the law of nations notwithstanding the absence of
private rights of action—express or implied—sanctions judicial interference
with foreign affairs and international relations.”91 Having analyzed the existence of a cause of action under § 1331, the court simply applied the same
analysis under § 1350, noting that the ATS “serves merely as an entrance into
the federal courts and in no way provides a cause of action to any plaintiff.”92
With the issue thus framed in terms of the cause of action, the Tel-Oren
case came before the D.C. Circuit on appeal.93 Judge Bork agreed with the
district court that a cause of action was required and that none existed.94
With respect to the ATS, he noted:
[T]here are three arguable theories about what law would supply the rule of
decision. The rule of decision might be the international law (treaty or customary international law) violated; it might be a federal common law of
torts; or it might be the tort law of whatever jurisdiction applicable choice of
law principles would point to.95

Bork rejected the possibility that treaties or customary international law
might provide a cause of action.96 He also rejected the possibility of a cause
86 See id. at 544–46, 548.
87 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
88 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
89 See Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 548 (“[S]ome of the plaintiffs and their personal representatives are citizens of the United States and cannot invoke a claim under § 1350.”).
Plaintiffs also claimed jurisdiction under the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006), and,
with respect to their claim against Libya, under the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1330, 1602–1611
(2006 & Supp. V), but the district court rejected both arguments. See Tel-Oren, 517 F.
Supp. at 549 n.3.
90 Tel-Oren, 517 F. Supp. at 545–48.
91 Id. at 548.
92 Id. at 549.
93 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
94 Id. at 798–823 (Bork, J., concurring).
95 Id. at 804 n.10 (citing Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 25, at 99–100).
96 See id. at 808–10, 816–19.
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of action founded in federal common law.97 Bork did not consider the possibility of a cause of action under foreign law, because the plaintiffs had
brought no such claim.
In contrast to the district court98 and Judge Bork,99 Judge Edwards did
not think the cause of action analysis was the same under the ATS as it was
under § 1331.
Unlike section 1331, which requires that an action “arise under” the laws of
the United States, section 1350 does not require that the action “arise
under” the law of nations, but only mandates a “violation of the law of
nations” in order to create a cause of action. The language of the statute is
explicit on this issue: by its express terms, nothing more than a violation of
the law of nations is required to invoke section 1350.100

Edwards thus concluded “that section 1350 itself provides a right to sue for
alleged violations of the law of nations.”101 He went on to discuss at some
length the possibility that a cause of action might “be found in the domestic
tort law of the United States,”102 but thought that this “formulation makes
sense only if construed to cover actions by aliens for domestic torts that occur
in the territory of the United States.”103 Like Bork, Edwards did not consider
the possibility of a cause of action under foreign law, because the plaintiffs
had not asserted such a claim.104
While the D.C. Circuit was debating the existence of a cause of action in
Tel-Oren, the district court in Filartiga was addressing the question of applicable law on remand.105 Although the plaintiffs briefed the availability of damages under Paraguayan law,106 they argued that, because the torture of
Joelito Filártiga was not just a municipal tort but also a violation of customary
international law, damages should not be “confined to what municipal law
provides, but must account as well for the international character of the tort
and the interest of the international community in just satisfaction.”107 The
97 See id. at 811 (“To say that international law is part of federal common law is to say
only that it is nonstatutory and nonconstitutional law to be applied, in appropriate cases, in
municipal courts. It is not to say that, like the common law of contract and tort, for example, by itself it affords individuals the right to ask for judicial relief.”).
98 See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542, 549 (D.D.C. 1981); supra
note 92 and accompanying text.
99 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 800 (Bork, J., concurring).
100 Id. at 779 (Edwards, J., concurring).
101 Id. at 780. He attributed the same view to the Second Circuit in Filartiga, although
the court there had expressly reached only the question of subject matter jurisdiction and
had reserved the question of applicable law. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
102 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 782 (Edwards, J., concurring).
103 Id. at 788.
104 See id. at 775 (per curiam). The third member of the panel did not address the
cause of action issue and would have dismissed on political question grounds. See id. at
823–27 (Robb, J., concurring).
105 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
106 Plaintiffs’ Post-Trial Memorandum of Facts and Law, Filartiga, 577 F. Supp. 860 (No.
79 Civ. 917), reprinted in ACEVES, supra note 10, at 655, 689–94.
107 Id. at 675.
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district court agreed. With respect to the substantive law governing liability,
the court concluded that it should “look[ ] to international law, which, as the
Court of Appeals stated, ‘became a part of the common law of the United States
upon the adoption of the Constitution.’”108 The district court seemed motivated by the fears that applying foreign law would allow other countries to
“enact immunities for government personnel”109 and that treatment as a
municipal tort would not reflect sufficient condemnation of torture since
“[w]e are dealing not with an ordinary case of assault and battery.”110
With respect to remedies, the district court reasoned that the ATS gives
federal courts the “power to choose and develop federal remedies to effectuate the purposes of the international law incorporated into United States
common law.”111 Citing conflicts authorities, the court looked “first to
Paraguayan law in determining the remedy for the violation of international
law.”112 Paraguayan law permitted “moral” damages for pain and suffering
but not punitive damages.113 Yet the district court thought it “essential and
proper to grant the remedy of punitive damages in order to give effect to the
manifest objectives of the international prohibition against torture.”114 In
addition to compensatory damages, it therefore awarded each of the plaintiffs five million dollars in punitive damages under federal common law.115
Judge Edwards’s opinion in Tel-Oren and Judge Nickerson’s decision in
Filartiga set the course for alien tort litigation going forward. Federal courts
accepted the need for a cause of action under the ATS, but held that the ATS
created the necessary cause of action in addition to conferring jurisdiction.116 In 1992, Congress spoke to the issue by passing the Torture Victim
Protection Act (TVPA), which establishes civil liability for torture and extrajudicial killing.117 The TVPA was a direct response to Judge Bork’s opinion in
Tel-Oren, and Congress expressed its intent not just to grant a “private right of
action” for those two human rights violations but to allow federal courts to
108 Filartiga, 577 F. Supp. at 863 (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d
Cir. 1980)).
109 Id. As noted above, this concern was ill-founded. See supra notes 40–47 and accompanying text.
110 Filartiga, 577 F. Supp. at 863.
111 Id. In ordinary tort cases, the substantive law applied also determines the available
damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 171 (1971) (“The law
selected by application of the rule of § 145 determines the measure of damages.”);
Borchers, supra note 21, at 52–53.
112 Filartiga, 577 F. Supp. at 864 (citing Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2) (1971)).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 865.
115 Id. at 867.
116 See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847–48 (11th Cir. 1996); Kadic v.
Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of
Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467, 1474–76 (9th Cir. 1994); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179
(D. Mass. 1995); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 212 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Forti v. Suarez-Mason,
672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
117 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)).
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recognize claims for violations of “other norms that already exist or may
ripen in the future into rules of customary international law.”118 The TVPA
thus seemed to endorse the notion that U.S. law should provide the causes of
action for torts in violation of the law of nations.
The question of applicable law received extended consideration in Xuncax v. Gramajo.119 Plaintiffs brought claims under both international and
domestic law against a former Guatemalan Minister of Defense.120 In considering the proper choice of law, the district court contrasted what it termed
the “Filartiga approach” of applying international law as the rule of decision
with a “[d]omestic [l]aw [a]lternative” that would look to either U.S. or foreign domestic tort law.121 The court reasoned that applying international
law was more consistent with the text and purpose of the ATS and would give
federal courts the flexibility “to develop a uniform federal common law
response to international law violations.”122 Applying domestic tort law, the
court noted, “mutes the grave international law aspect of the tort, reducing it
to no more (or less) than a garden-variety municipal tort.”123 Although the
district court declined to apply domestic law to the merits of the plaintiffs’
ATS claims,124 it did exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their domestic
law claims, finding the claims for wrongful death, assault and battery, false
imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress to be governed by Guatemalan law.125 The court found inadequate evidence that
punitive damages would be allowed under Guatemalan law,126 but it did
award punitive damages on the international law claims, following “the developing body of federal common law precedent which has allowed both compensatory and punitive damages for such harms.”127
While most federal courts took the international law road, the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Trajano v. Marcos128 showed what the other road might
have looked like. In a suit against the daughter of the former Philippine
President,129 the district court had construed the ATS to be purely jurisdictional and had determined damages under Philippine law.130 The court of
appeals thus “assume[d] that the court did not rely on treaties or interna118 H.R. REP. NO. 102-367(I), at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86; see also
S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 4–5 (1991) (addressing Judge Bork’s concurring opinion in TelOren and noting that the ATS “should remain intact”).
119 Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. 162.
120 Id. at 169.
121 Id. at 179–83.
122 Id. at 182.
123 Id. at 183.
124 See id.
125 See id. at 194–97. The court found one claim of defamation to be governed by
Kentucky law. See id. at 197.
126 Id. at 202.
127 Id. at 198.
128 Trajano v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos), 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992).
129 Id. at 495.
130 See id. at 503.
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tional law to provide the cause of action, only to establish federal jurisdiction.”131 The Ninth Circuit observed that this “approach comports with the
view that the First Congress enacted the predecessor to § 1350 to provide a
federal forum for transitory torts . . . whenever such actions implicate the
foreign relations of the United States.”132 It further noted that this
“approach also allows the ‘law of nations’ and ‘treaty’ prongs of § 1350 to be
treated consistently, in that the cause of action comes from municipal tort
law.”133 Significantly, the Ninth Circuit saw no Article III problem with this
approach. Citing Verlinden, the court reasoned that the need to “decide
whether there is an applicable norm of international law, whether it is recognized by the United States, what its status is, and whether it was violated in
the particular case” were federal questions sufficient to establish “arising
under” jurisdiction under Article III.134
But not even the Ninth Circuit pursued this path in subsequent cases.135
In Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, the court of appeals held that the ATS created a
federal cause of action,136 and while it noted the possibility of applying
municipal tort law, the court found it unnecessary to decide the question
because the plaintiffs had not raised it.137 In Alvarez-Machain v. United States,
the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc reaffirmed that the ATS creates a cause of
131 Id.
132 Id. (citation omitted).
133 Id. Judge Bork had found it anomalous in Tel-Oren to imply a cause of action for
violations of the law of nations when no cause of action would be implied for non-selfexecuting treaties. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 820 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (“If, as Judge Edwards states and Filartiga assumes, section
1350 not only confers jurisdiction but creates a private cause of action for any violation of
the ‘law of nations,’ then it also creates a private cause of action for any violation of ‘treaties of the United States.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976))).
134 Trajano, 978 F.2d at 502 (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.
480, 495 (1983)). Applying its decision in Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095
(9th Cir. 1990), abrogated by Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010), the court also held
that the need to determine whether a foreign official was entitled to immunity under the
FSIA was sufficient to establish “arising under” jurisdiction under Article III. Trajano, 978
F.2d at 501–02. The Supreme Court would abrogate Chuidian in Samantar v. Yousuf and
hold that the immunity of foreign officials was governed by federal common law. 560 U.S.
at 325.
135 In Tachiona v. Mugabe, 216 F. Supp. 2d 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), the district court initially held that it was obligated to apply foreign law, id. at 268, but after further briefing
concluded that it would apply foreign law only to the extent it was consistent with international law and federal common law. See Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 406,
418–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
136 Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir.
1994).
137 Id. at 1476 n.10 (citing Trajano, 978 F.2d at 503). In a subsequent appeal, the court
affirmed an award of exemplary damages against the Marcos estate on the ground that
such damages were permitted under Philippine law. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d
767, 771–72, 779–80, 787 (9th Cir. 1996).
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action for violations of international law,138 applied customary international
law to the merits,139 and applied federal common law to the question of damages.140 The court noted that the policy expressed in the ATS was “to provide a remedy for violations of the law of nations” and concluded that
“limitations on damages under Mexican law—including the unavailability of
punitive damages—are not consistent with the congressional policy that
underlies the [ATS].”141
Thus by the mid-1990s, ATS cases had clearly taken the international law
road, which was really a road that combined the application of international
law and federal law in various ways. The customary international law on torture, extrajudicial killing, causing disappearances, genocide, etc. provided
the rules of decision in ATS cases.142 Federal statutory law provided the
cause of action, either the ATS itself or (for torture and extrajudicial killing)
the TVPA.143 Federal common law provided the remedies, including punitive damages that would not have been available under the municipal law of
many countries where the human rights violations occurred.144 Although
successful plaintiffs rarely collected any damages,145 both the application of
international law and the availability of punitive damages were thought necessary to express appropriate condemnation of acts that were certainly not
“garden-variety municipal tort[s].”146 These doctrinal choices were made in
cases that resembled Filartiga, with one alien bringing suit against another
alien for serious human rights abuses that occurred abroad. In 1996, a new
wave of ATS litigation began, with plaintiffs bringing suits against corporations—often U.S. corporations—for complicity in foreign government violations of human rights. These cases raised a new choice of law issue: whether
international law or federal common law should provide the rules for aiding
and abetting liability.147
III. HOW WAY LEADS

ON TO

WAY

And both that morning equally lay
In leaves no step had trodden black.
Oh, I kept the first for another day!
138 See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 612–13 (9th Cir. 2003) (en
banc), rev’d sub nom. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
139 See id. at 620–31.
140 See id. at 632–36.
141 Id. at 635.
142 See supra notes 85–127 and accompanying text.
143 See supra notes 101–04, 116–18, and accompanying text.
144 See supra notes 111–15, 126–27, 140–41, and accompanying text.
145 See Stephens, supra note 4, at 1467 (“[O]nly a handful of lawsuits have produced
enforceable judgments for plaintiffs, while another handful settled . . . .”).
146 Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995); see also Filartiga v. PenaIrala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (“We are dealing not with an ordinary case of
assault and battery.”).
147 See infra Part III.
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Yet knowing how way leads on to way,
I doubted if I should ever come back.148
The way from suits against individuals to suits against corporations was
revealed in Kadic v. Karadžić,149 a case against Bosnian-Serb leader Radovan
Karadžić alleging genocide, war crimes, torture, and summary execution.150
Because the Bosnian-Serb entity of Srpska was not a recognized foreign state,
the question arose whether state action was a necessary ingredient in ATS
suits.151 The Second Circuit held that the customary international law norms
against genocide and war crimes applied to private individuals irrespective of
state action,152 and that the state action requirements for torture and extrajudicial killing might be met by showing that Karadžić “[a]ct[ed] in concert
with a foreign state.”153 As Beth Stephens noted:
These two principles permit the application of the [ATS] to corporate
defendants. Private corporations are liable for violations of human rights
norms such as genocide, slavery and war crimes that by definition apply to
private actors as well as official government agents. Moreover, corporations
can be held liable for violations committed “in concert with” government
officials.154

The first ATS suits against corporations were filed in 1996, the year after
Kadic.155 In the most famous of these, two sets of villagers from Myanmar
brought suit alleging that Unocal Corporation had aided and abetted the
Myanmar military in subjecting them to forced labor, murder, rape, and torture in connection with the building of a pipeline.156 On a motion to dismiss,157 the district court followed Kadic, looking to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
jurisprudence to see if the allegations in the complaint satisfied the require148 FROST, supra note 9, at 9.
149 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
150 Id. at 236–37.
151 Id. at 239.
152 Id. at 241–43.
153 Id. at 243, 245. Kadic looked to federal law to determine whether the state action
requirement had been satisfied, applying the “color of law” jurisprudence developed in
civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 245 (internal quotation marks omitted). A
district court had looked to § 1983 in Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1546 (N.D.
Cal. 1987), and Congress endorsed this approach with respect to the TVPA’s state action
requirement. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367(I), at 5 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84,
87; S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8 (1991).
154 Beth Stephens, Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human Rights Through Domestic Litigation,
24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 401, 407 (2001).
155 See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997), aff’d, 197
F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in
part and rev’d in part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated & reh’g granted, 395 F.3d 978
(9th Cir. 2003), and dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Other ATS cases
against corporations soon followed. See Stephens, supra note 4, at 1517–19.
156 Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 883–84.
157 Id. at 884.
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ment of state action158 and holding that private actors may be held liable for
forced labor, as a modern form of slave trading, even in the absence of state
action.159 A few years later, on motion for summary judgment and before a
different judge, the district court held that plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence to meet § 1983’s state action standard.160 With respect to
complicity for the Myanmar military’s forced labor practices, however, the
court looked to international law, holding that the decisions of the Nuremberg Tribunal required not just “knowledge that someone else would commit
abuses” but “participation or cooperation in the forced labor practices.”161
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the choice of law governing complicity
took center stage. The panel majority agreed with the district court that liability for aiding and abetting should be governed by “international law as
developed in the decisions by international criminal tribunals.”162 It found
that law in recent decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) required practical assistance that has a “substantial
effect” on the perpetration of the crime, coupled with “knowledge” that the
defendant’s actions would assist in the commission of the crime.163 The
Ninth Circuit specifically rejected the suggestion that it should apply the
domestic law of Myanmar, quoting Xuncax’s observation that to do so would
“‘mute[ ] the grave international law aspect of the tort, reducing it to no more
(or less) than a garden-variety municipal tort.’”164
In a concurring opinion, Judge Reinhardt differed over the law applicable to the question of complicity. In his view, once a tort in violation of
international law had been established, federal common law governed “the
ancillary legal question of Unocal’s third-party tort liability.”165 He pointed
to the “unique federal interests involved in Alien Tort Claims Act cases that
support the creation of a uniform body of federal common law to facilitate
the implementation of such claims.”166 Judge Reinhardt also had doubts
about both the substance and the status of the international law rule applied
by the majority. On substance, he pointed out that the ICTY’s decisions
158 Id. at 890–91 (citing Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995)).
159 Id. at 891.
160 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1305–07 (C.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in part
and rev’d in part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated & reh’g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th
Cir. 2003), and dismissed, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
161 Id. at 1310.
162 Unocal, 395 F.3d at 948. Bizarrely, the court suggested that its decision to apply
international law was limited to the facts of this case and that in other cases “application of
the law of the forum state—including federal common law—or the law of the state where
the events occurred may be appropriate.” Id. at 949 n.25.
163 Id. at 950 (quoting Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment,
¶¶ 235, 245 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998)). The panel
rejected the “active participation” standard applied by the district court as relevant only to
overcoming a defense of necessity. See id. at 947–48.
164 Id. at 948 (quoting Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995)).
165 Id. at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
166 Id. at 965.
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would permit liability for providing “moral support,” which was “far too
uncertain and inchoate a rule for us to adopt without further elaboration.”167 On status, he characterized the ICTY as “a recently-constituted ad
hoc international tribunal”168 and pointed out that future tribunals might
define the standard differently.169 Judge Reinhardt preferred to apply federal common law on joint venture, agency, and reckless disregard—principles that were well established and over which the federal courts maintained
control.170
Advocates for human rights victims, while not opposed to applying international law, seemed to prefer federal common law on questions of complicity. Writing in 1996, Beth Stephens and Michael Ratner observed: “While
international law is generally favorable to plaintiffs . . . , it might limit the
court’s ability to develop a full range of remedies for the conduct alleged in
suits under the ATCA. The flexibility of the common law approach allows
the court to reject an unduly restrictive international law precedent.”171 Similarly in 2003, just after the Ninth Circuit’s Unocal decision, Paul Hoffman
and Daniel Zaheer argued “that federal courts must fashion federal common
law based on federal jurisprudence and international authority to determine
rules for complicity liability and other ancillary standards in ATCA litigation.”172 Like Judge Reinhardt, they seemed concerned about the status of
the international law rule on aiding and abetting, although they also argued
at some length that it was well settled173 and “identical” to the federal common law standard for aiding and abetting liability.174 In particular, Hoffman
and Zaheer worried that aiding and abetting might not meet the “specific,
universal and obligatory” standard that lower courts had applied to screen
actionable violations and that the Supreme Court would soon endorse in
Sosa.175
167 Id. at 969-70. The majority found it unnecessary to reach the question whether
mere moral support would be sufficient. See id. at 951 (majority opinion).
168 Id. at 967 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
169 See id. at 970. For further discussion of aiding and abetting liability under international law, see infra note 211.
170 See Unocal, 395 F.3d at 970-76. Judge Reinhardt did not point to federal common
law on aiding and abetting, though the majority pointed out that the ICTY’s standard of
knowing substantial assistance was similar to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876
(1979). See Unocal, 395 F.3d at 951.
171 STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 47, at 122. They rejected the “foreign law
approach,” which “could result in a narrow and cramped decision that awards minimal
damages or even results in a dismissal, if, for example, the foreign state has passed an
amnesty law.” Id.
172 Paul L. Hoffman & Daniel A Zaheer, The Rules of the Road: Federal Common Law and
Aiding and Abetting Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 47, 49
(2003).
173 See id. at 70-75.
174 Id. at 79.
175 Id. at 70 (“[A] ‘specific, universal and obligatory’ norm is not necessary for proscribing an aiding and abetting violation of international law.”). Hoffman and Zaheer added
an addendum following the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Sosa (which Hoffman

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-4\NDL403.txt

2014]

unknown

the road not taken

Seq: 21

8-MAY-14

9:21

1597

Sosa was not a corporate case, but it ratified the lower courts’ decisions
to apply a combination of international law and federal law in ATS cases and
fixed the analytic framework for cases against corporations, including Kiobel.
The plaintiff, Humberto Alvarez-Machain, had been abducted from Mexico
by Jose Francisco Sosa and other Mexican nationals at the behest of the U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to stand trial for involvement in
the murder of a DEA agent.176 After his acquittal, Alvarez filed suit against
the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act and against Sosa under
the ATS. Before the Supreme Court, Sosa argued that the ATS was strictly
jurisdictional and that it did not create a cause of action.177 The Bush
Administration supported that argument178 and added that inferring a cause
of action from the ATS would violate the presumption against extraterritoriality, which was designed to protect “‘against unintended clashes between
our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord.’”179 The U.S. brief emphasized “[t]he potentially disruptive effects of
Section 1350 litigation on the foreign policy interests of the United States,”
citing the pending suit against corporations that had done business in South
Africa under Apartheid as a particular example.180 The presumption would
have applied to any statute creating a cause of action, the Bush Administration noted, and by inferring a cause of action from the ATS instead, the court
of appeals had “essentially bypassed the presumption against
extraterritoriality.”181
The Supreme Court agreed with Sosa and the United States that the ATS
was “strictly jurisdictional”182 but refused to accept “that the ATS was stillborn because there could be no claim for relief without a further statute
expressly authorizing adoption of causes of action.”183 Agreeing with an amiargued), in which they read Sosa to endorse “federal common lawmaking,” id. at 86, and
argued that the “specific, universal and obligatory” test did not apply to “subsidiary rules of
decision,” id. at 87, like aiding and abetting liability. For more on the interpretations of
Sosa, see infra notes 188–225 and accompanying text.
176 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697-98 (2004).
177 Brief of Petitioner at 9-45, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339).
178 Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 11–24, Sosa, 542
U.S. 692 (No. 03-339).
179 Id. at 47 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248
(1991)). The Bush Administration had previewed this argument in two 2003 filings. See
Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 29-31, Doe I v. Unocal Corp.,
403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628); Supplemental Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 21-23, Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F.
Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005) (No. CIV.A.01-1357 (LFO)). As Eugene Kontorovich has
noted, the United States “had filed at least six prior amicus briefs in ATS cases, starting
with Filartiga, without having raised the extraterritoriality issue.” Kontorovich, supra note
3, at 1677.
180 Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner, supra note 178, at
43.
181 Id. at 48.
182 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713.
183 Id. at 714.
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cus brief, the Court held that the ATS was “enacted on the understanding
that the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number
of international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the
time.”184 The Court then translated this proposition to a post-Erie world by
articulating a restrictive test for the recognition of causes of action under
federal common law: “federal courts should not recognize private claims
under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with
less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted.”185 Looking to the “current
state of international law” for the substantive rule on arbitrary detention,186
the Court held that “a single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by
the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law so well defined as to support
the creation of a federal remedy.”187
As William Casto noted, Sosa “established an analytical watershed for litigation under the Alien Tort Statute.”188 It drew upon “the well-established
distinction between rights and remedies,” with the rights governed by international law and the remedies by federal common law.189 “All questions as
to whether the defendant has acted unlawfully must be answered by recourse
to rules of decision found in international law.”190 But questions like the
statute of limitations, the survival of an action after the defendant’s death,
vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior, and the availability of punitive damages would be answered by resort to federal common

184 Id. at 724. I wrote the amicus brief the Court followed on this point. See supra note
*.
185 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. The Court noted that this limit was consistent with the standards applied by many lower courts, specifically citing the “specific, universal, and obligatory” standard applied by the Ninth Circuit in Hilao, as well as Filartiga and Judge
Edwards’s opinion in Tel-Oren. See id. (citing Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of
Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994), Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) and Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)).
186 Id. at 733.
187 Id. at 738.
188 William R. Casto, The New Federal Common Law of Tort Remedies for Violations of International Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 635, 635 (2006).
189 Id. at 638; see also BETH STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
IN U.S. COURTS 36-37 (2d ed. 2008) (“Sosa clarified the central choice of law issues in ATS
cases by holding: (1) the substantive violation is governed by international law; and (2)
federal common law provides the cause of action and, therefore, governs non-substantive
issues.”); William R. Casto, The ATS Cause of Action Is Sui Generis, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1545, 1546 (2014) (“In international torts, however, the norm and the remedy do not
come from the same sovereign. The norm comes from international law, and the remedy
is legislated by federal courts.”).
190 Casto, supra note 188, at 643.
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law.191 Casto put aiding and abetting on the international law side of this
line,192 but not everyone agreed.193
In the corporate cases, advocates on both sides subsequently viewed the
question of aiding and abetting liability through the lens of the Sosa framework. In Unocal, the Ninth Circuit had granted rehearing en banc prior to
Sosa and now called for further briefing.194 Plaintiffs initially suggested that
international law might govern:
In [Sosa], the Supreme Court specifically concluded that ATS claims are
“claims under federal common law.” Thus, the federal courts must develop
principles to govern ATS litigation. Because international law is part of federal common law, international law principles of aiding and abetting are
applicable to determine liability; aiding and abetting is also recognized generally under federal common law.195
191 See id. at 642, 644, 652. Casto acknowledged the shift from his 1986 article in light
of Sosa. See id. at 652 n.100; supra notes 33–39 and accompanying text.
192 Casto, supra note 188, at 650 (arguing that because “aiding-and-abetting is a conduct-regulating norm,” such liability “is inappropriate in ATS litigation unless a norm of
international law forbids private persons to assist violators”); see also Chimène I. Keitner,
Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 73–83 (2008). Professor
Ingrid Wuerth rejected the dilemma of a binary choice and suggested that
[T]he relationship between federal common law and international law is not
binary but instead is best understood on a continuum, with certain aspects of ATS
litigation governed by federal common law that is tightly linked to international
law, other aspects governed by federal common law that is not derived from international norms, and still others that fall somewhere in between.
Ingrid Wuerth, The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law: A New Approach, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1931, 1932–33 (2010).
193 See Hoffman & Zaheer, supra note 172, at 88 (“To require a court to find a ‘specific,
universal and obligatory’ prohibition against aiding and abetting is as nonsensical as
requiring such a finding with respect to defenses, damages, statutes of limitations, and
numerous other ancillary rules that are essential elements of any civil case.”); Ralph G.
Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Future of
International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2241, 2274 (2004)
(“[T]he federal courts in ATS cases must derive federal common law rules to govern such
issues as statutes of limitation, standing to sue, exhaustion of remedies, third party complicity, and the like.”); Beth Stephens, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: “The Door Is Still Ajar” for
Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 560 (2005) (noting with
respect to aiding and abetting liability that “a court might ask first whether international
law provides a clear answer, then look to federal vicarious liability standards as necessary to
fill any gaps”).
194 The parties settled before rehearing. The Ninth Circuit panel’s decision had been
vacated upon the grant of rehearing, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003),
and the en banc panel granted a motion to vacate the district court’s 2000 opinion granting summary judgment, see Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc),
leaving the district court’s 1997 decision denying the motion to dismiss as the last word in
this case.
195 Doe and Roe Plaintiffs’ and Appellants’ Supplemental Brief at 18, Unocal, 403 F.3d
708 (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628, 00-57195, 00-57197) (en banc) (citations omitted).
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But over the next few years plaintiffs increasingly argued for the application
of federal common law rules on aiding and abetting, particularly as cases
applying international law started to go against them.196
In the Apartheid case, which both the Bush Administration brief and the
Supreme Court had singled out in Sosa,197 the district court held that international law did not prohibit aiding and abetting human rights violations
clearly enough to meet the Sosa standard.198 On appeal, plaintiffs argued
that aiding and abetting was an “ancillary” rule that did not have to meet the
Sosa standard.199 “The District Court should have determined whether plaintiffs’ complaint alleged substantive violations of ‘specific, universal, and obligatory’ international norms, and then consulted federal common law to
determine whether aiding and abetting liability exists for suits under the
ATS.”200 The Second Circuit panel divided three ways. Judge Katzmann
thought that international law rules should apply to aiding and abetting,201
but that international law required that the defendant have acted “with the
purpose of facilitating the commission of th[e] crime.”202 Judge Hall
thought “a federal court should consult the federal common law” to derive a
standard for aiding and abetting liability203 and that federal common law
required only that the defendant act with knowledge.204 Lastly, although
Judge Korman agreed with Katzmann that international law should govern
aiding and abetting liability,205 he doubted that there was any international
law definition of aiding and abetting sufficient to meet the Sosa standard.206
196 See Katherine Gallagher, Civil Litigation and Transnational Business: An Alien Tort Statute Primer, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 745, 762 (2010) (noting that plaintiffs argued “that as the
Supreme Court has said that the ATS is a creature of US federal common law, courts
should look to federal common law to answer such questions” as aiding and abetting liability); Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing Effects of Tort: How Corporate Complicity Liability Under
the Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 207, 214 (2008)
(“[T]he better view, espoused by most human rights plaintiffs, is that courts may therefore
apply federal common law liability rules.” (footnotes omitted)).
197 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004); supra note 180 and
accompanying text.
198 See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 549-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
199 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 30-32, Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504
F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (No. 05-2326).
200 Id. at 32.
201 Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 268 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
202 Id. at 277. Judge Katzmann acknowledged that some international tribunals had
adopted a “knowledge” standard for mens rea, but suggested that the narrower “purpose”
standard was necessary to satisfy Sosa. See id. at 276-77 n.12.
203 Id. at 284 (Hall, J., concurring).
204 See id. at 287 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979)).
205 See id. at 331 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
206 See id. at 333. He nevertheless concurred in Judge Katzmann’s “purpose” standard
for mens rea in order to give the district court a test to apply on remand. See id. Judge
Korman also urged dismissal on a variety of other grounds, including the novel claim that
international law did not recognize corporate liability. See id. at 321-26.
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Defendants petitioned for certiorari, but the Supreme Court was unable to
muster a quorum.207
The Second Circuit addressed the question of aiding and abetting liability again in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., holding that
such liability was governed by international law and adopting Judge
Katzmann’s “purpose” standard as the law of the circuit.208 Plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for review, arguing that the Second Circuit’s decision to apply international law to aiding and abetting liability was
“inconsistent with this Court’s decision in [Sosa] that civil claims under the
ATS are based upon federal common law.”209 Under federal common law,
plaintiffs argued, the standard for aiding and abetting liability is “[k]nowing
assistance.”210 In retrospect, the better argument might have been that international law applied to aiding and abetting claims with a “knowledge” standard for mens rea.211 As my colleague Chimène Keitner pointed out,
applying international law to aiding and abetting claims “avoids criticism of
207 See Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008) (affirming without
precedential effect pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (2006)).
208 582 F.3d 244, 257-59 (2d Cir. 2009).
209 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 79 (2010) (No. 09-1262) [hereinafter Talisman Petition].
210 Id. at 24-26.
211 See Keitner, supra note 192, at 83–96. The “knowledge” standard for aiding and
abetting liability dates back to Nuremberg’s Zyklon B Case, in which two defendants were
convicted of war crimes for “supply[ing] poison gas used for the extermination of allied
nationals interned in concentration camps well knowing that the said gas was to be so
used.” Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (The Zyklon B Case), in 1 LAW REPORTS OF
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93 (1947); see United States v. Ohlendorf (The Einsatzgruppen
Case), in 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 569 (n.d.) [hereinafter TRIALS]; United States v. Flick
(The Flick Case), in 6 TRIALS, supra, at 1217 (1952); United States v. Krauch (The I.G.
Farben Case), in 8 TRIALS, supra, at 1169 (1952). The Ministries Case, on which some federal courts have relied for a “purpose” standard, also applied a “knowledge” standard. See
United States v. von Weizsaecker (The Ministries Case), in 14 TRIALS, supra, at 478, 620,
622. The banker Karl Rasche was acquitted in that case not because the tribunal required
a mens rea of purpose, but because it found that making a loan was not a sufficient actus
reus. See id. at 622. And the “purpose” test in Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute, on
which some federal courts have also relied, “was negotiated not to codify customary international law but to accommodate the numerous views of common law and civil law experts
about how, precisely, to express the mens rea of the aider or abetter” for the particular
purposes of the International Criminal Court. Brief of David J. Scheffer, Director of the
Center for International Human Rights, as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Issuance of a
Writ of Certiorari at 11, Talisman, 131 S. Ct. 79 (No. 09-1262) (expressing the views of the
lead U.S. negotiator at the Rome Conference). The Nuremberg precedents, together with
the more recent decisions of international criminal tribunals adopting a “knowledge”
requirement, see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Trial Chamber Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 180 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Jan. 27, 2000); Prosecutor v.
Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 249 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 486 (Special Court for Sierra Leone May 18, 2012), are plainly
sufficient to meet the Sosa standard.
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applying U.S. law to defendants’ conduct in an international system that generally disfavors the extraterritorial application of domestic substantive
law.”212 Although plaintiffs did argue to the Supreme Court in Talisman that
international law required only knowledge for aiding and abetting liability,
that argument was clearly secondary.213 In any event, although the Supreme
Court was able to muster a quorum this time, it denied cert.214
While plaintiffs increasingly argued that federal common law governed
every question but the initial violation of the law of nations, the United States
government pointed to the applicability of federal common law as grounds
for applying the presumption against extraterritoriality. No Justice had
accepted this argument in Sosa, but in the Bush Administration’s view, Sosa’s
decision to base ATS causes of action on federal common law made the presumption all the more salient. The United States’ supplemental brief in Unocal emphasized that under Sosa “any cause of action recognized by a federal
court is one devised as a matter of federal common law—i.e. the law of the
United States.”215 The United States claimed that “[i]t would be extraordinary to give U.S. law an extraterritorial effect to regulate conduct by a foreign
country vis-a[-]vis its own citizens in its own territory, and all the more so for
a federal court to do so as a matter of common law-making power.”216 The
Bush Administration repeated this argument in Khulumani, Talisman, and
other cases.217

212 Keitner, supra note 192, at 74.
213 Talisman Petition, supra note 209, at 27–33. The standard for aiding and abetting
under customary international law may have seemed less cert-worthy at the time because
there was not yet a circuit split on that question. Compare Talisman, 582 F.3d at 257–59
(adopting a purpose standard under international law), and Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d
388, 401 (4th Cir. 2011) (same), with Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 39 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (adopting a knowledge standard under international law); see also Sarei v. Rio Tinto,
PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 765 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (noting the question without deciding
it).
214 Talisman, 131 S. Ct. at 79.
215 See Supplemental Brief for the United States of America, as Amicus Curiae at 4, Doe
I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628).
216 Id.; see also id. at 4–7 (discussing the presumption against extraterritoriality).
217 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12–16,
Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008) (No. 07-919); Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 5–12, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy,
Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 07-0016); Brief for the United States of America, as
Amicus Curiae at 5–8, Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Nos. 05-2141-CV, 05-2326-CV). Professor Michael Ramsey made a related argument that
creating a cause of action was an exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe and that, because
aiding and abetting was not an offense subject to universal jurisdiction, creating such a
cause of action with respect to foreign corporations would violate international law limitations on jurisdiction to prescribe. See Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits on Investor Liability in Human Rights Litigation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 292–320 (2009).
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I argued that the Bush Administration’s interpretation of Sosa was fundamentally mistaken.218 U.S. courts did not apply U.S. substantive law in ATS
cases, I explained, but rather customary international law.219 “Customary
international law is not made by the United States alone and cannot be
applied ‘extraterritorially,’ since it is, by definition, binding in all countries.”220 To be clear, I did not argue that courts should apply foreign
domestic law in ATS cases—alien tort litigation had taken a different path
long ago. But I did argue that the application of customary international law
in ATS cases was like “what U.S. courts do in ordinary conflict-of-laws cases
when they apply foreign substantive law”221 and that U.S. courts were exercising “not jurisdiction to prescribe but jurisdiction to adjudicate.”222 Sosa had
established a restrictive standard for federal common law causes of action not
to impose additional U.S. substantive obligations on foreign conduct, but
rather to limit the adjudication in U.S. courts of claims under existing customary international law.223 It would be utterly misguided (and profoundly
ironic), I thought, to use this limiting cause of action as the basis for further
limitation through the presumption against extraterritoriality.
Lower federal courts rejected the Bush Administration’s extraterritoriality argument.224 “The norms being applied under the ATS are international,
not domestic, ones,” the Ninth Circuit observed.225 Of course, the more U.S.
courts applied not international law but federal common law as the rule of
decision, the more difficult this argument was to maintain.
IV.

KIOBEL

AND THE

ROAD NOT TAKEN

I shall be telling this with a sigh
Somewhere ages and ages hence:
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I—
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.226
218 See William S. Dodge, Alien Tort Litigation and the Prescriptive Jurisdiction Fallacy, 51
HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 35 (2010).
219 See id. at 37.
220 Id. at 45.
221 Id. at 39.
222 Id. at 37.
223 See id. at 43 (“Simply put, Sosa’s language about creating federal common law causes
of action describes not a new exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction but a new limit on adjudicatory jurisdiction.”). For a post-Kiobel argument along the same lines, see Anthony J.
Colangelo, Kiobel: Muddling the Distinction Between Prescriptive and Adjudicative Jurisdiction,
28 MD. J. INT’L L. 65 (2013).
224 See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 745–47 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc);
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 20–28 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Flomo v. Firestone Natural
Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir. 2011).
225 Sarei, 671 F.3d at 746. The court also held that if the presumption applied it would
be rebutted. See id. at 745 (“Moreover, we know from Sosa, that the Congress in 1789 had
overseas conduct in mind.”).
226 FROST, supra note 9, at 9.
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Kiobel arrived at the Supreme Court by an odd route. Nigerian nationals
brought a class action against Royal Dutch Petroleum, an Anglo-Dutch corporation, for aiding and abetting the Nigerian government in committing a
number of human rights violations in the Ogoni region of Nigeria.227 The
district court held that aiding and abetting claims could be brought under
the ATS and that some of the alleged violations of international law did not
meet the Sosa standard and certified the case for interlocutory appeal.228 On
appeal, the Second Circuit dismissed the entire complaint on a ground not
addressed by the district court—that “customary international law has steadfastly rejected the notion of corporate liability for international crimes.”229
The Supreme Court granted plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari on the
question of corporate liability, but following oral argument, directed the parties to brief the additional question whether courts may recognize causes of
action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a
country other than the United States.230 Plaintiffs argued against a territorial
limitation, invoking the transitory tort doctrine.231 They acknowledged that
in “transitory tort cases U.S. courts are simply adjudicating the legal obligations supplied by foreign law,” but argued that the doctrine applied because
“[i]n all ATS cases the tortfeasor is held to universally-recognized standards
supplied by customary international law governing the underlying wrongful
conduct.”232 Plaintiffs explained that “[t]his is so even if U.S. federal common law provides some of the rules governing the litigation because the
international system assumes that domestic legal systems will use their own
remedial systems to enforce international law.”233 In arguing that the ATS
was consistent with international law rules on jurisdiction, plaintiffs again
227 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662–63 (2013).
228 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 463–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Royal Dutch Petroleum did not move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, presumably because the Second Circuit had rejected
those defenses in a different case arising from the same facts, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 226 F.3d 88, 94–108 (2d Cir. 2000). This deprived the district court, the court of
appeals, and ultimately the Supreme Court of two doctrines designed to screen out cases
that have minimal contacts to the United States. Cf. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746,
753–63 (2014) (dismissing ATS suit for lack of general jurisdiction over parent
corporation).
229 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010). The Second
Circuit reached the wrong answer by asking the wrong question. As the Obama Administration argued before the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit should not have “examined
the question of corporate liability in the abstract” but rather looked to see “whether any of
the particular international-law norms [at issue] exclude corporations from their scope.”
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 21, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct.
1659 (No. 10-1491). For further discussion, see William S. Dodge, Corporate Liability Under
Customary International Law, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1045 (2012).
230 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.
231 See Petitioners’ Supplemental Opening Brief at 27–31, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No.
10-1491).
232 Id. at 30.
233 Id. at 30–31.
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emphasized that “ATS actions enforce universally-recognized norms of customary international law binding in every country through the domestic
mechanism of federal common law, not substantive norms of American public law prescribed by Congress.”234
Respondents, for their part, argued that “[t]he presumption against
extraterritorial application of U.S. law is triggered” because under Sosa
“courts apply a civil cause of action under U.S. federal common law to remedy a violation of an international-law norm.”235 The transitory tort doctrine
was inapposite because “[i]n such cases, the cause of action is afforded by the
law of the place of the conduct.”236 As for the Obama Administration, the
Justice Department’s amicus brief acknowledged that “there are circumstances in which it would be appropriate for a court to recognize a cause of
action based on the ATS for violations of international law occurring outside
the United States.”237 But consistent with the Bush Administration’s briefs,
the Justice Department also argued that “a private right of action fashioned
by a court exercising jurisdiction under the ATS constitutes application of
the substantive and remedial law of the United States”238 and that a court
“must take account of the principles underlying the presumption against
extraterritorial application of federal statutes, especially where the alleged
conduct has no substantial connection to or impact on the United States.”239
Putting the question of corporate liability to one side, the Supreme
Court held that “the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims
under the ATS.”240 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that the presumption does not typically apply to jurisdictional statutes,241 but he reasoned that “the principles underlying the canon of
interpretation similarly constrain courts considering causes of action that
may be brought under the ATS.”242 Roberts distinguished the transitory tort
doctrine invoked by plaintiffs on the ground that courts in such cases applied
foreign law.243 “The question under Sosa is not whether a federal court has
jurisdiction to entertain a cause of action provided by foreign or even international law,”244 he noted. “The question is instead whether the court has
authority to recognize a cause of action under U.S. law to enforce a norm of
international law.”245
234 Id. at 40.
235 Supplemental Brief for Respondents at 6–7, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491).
236 Id. at 17.
237 Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of
Affirmance at 6, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491).
238 Id. at 2.
239 Id. at 15–16.
240 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
241 See id. at 1664 (“We typically apply the presumption to discern whether an Act of
Congress regulating conduct applies abroad.”).
242 Id.
243 See id. at 1666.
244 Id.
245 Id.
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Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsberg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, concurred only in the judgment. He thought the presumption against extraterritoriality was overcome by the subject matter of the ATS and the fact that one
of the historical paradigms (piracy) would typically have occurred outside the
United States.246 But Breyer still viewed the question of geographic scope
through Sosa’s lens as an exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction. Specifically, he
looked for guidance to customary international law rules on jurisdiction to
prescribe247 and concluded (somewhat mysteriously)248 that the ATS should
be limited to situations where (1) the tort occurred on U.S. soil; (2) the
defendant was a U.S. national; or (3) the United States had another important interest, including its interest in not becoming a “safe harbor” for
torturers.249
It is difficult to see how either the Kiobel majority or Justice Breyer could
have reached the conclusions that they did if alien tort litigation had taken
the more traditional path of applying the lex loci delicti to transitory torts. A
suit for torture under the ATS would have been treated no differently than a
suit for battery under foreign law is treated in state court, or indeed than
such a suit is treated in the courts of many other nations.250 It would have
been clear that courts hearing such cases were not exercising jurisdiction to
prescribe the applicable law, but rather jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes
under laws prescribed by other nations. The main difference between an
ATS suit and a transitory tort suit in state court would have been the need to
determine that the law of nations had been violated in order to secure a
federal forum. As explained above, such a determination would have been
sufficient under Verlinden to satisfy the requirement for Article III jurisdiction.251 And while it may not have had the same symbolic value as applying
international law directly to the merits, it would have had symbolic value nevertheless—for a federal court would still have found that the defendant had
engaged in torture or some other violation of international law.
But that is not the road that alien tort litigation took. To distinguish
torture from “a garden-variety municipal tort,” federal courts chose to apply
international law as the rule of decision.252 “[T]o give effect to the manifest
objectives of the international prohibition against torture,” they chose to
award punitive damages under federal common law.253 Sosa ratified these
decisions and added another domestic element—a cause of action based in
246 Id. at 1672–73 (Breyer, J., concurring).
247 Id. at 1673 (discussing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§§ 402–404).
248 See Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court and the
Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 601, 619 (2013) (“The relationship between [Breyer’s]
opinion and customary international law of prescriptive jurisdiction . . . is ultimately
unclear.”).
249 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring).
250 See supra note 21.
251 See supra notes 59–71 and accompanying text.
252 Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995).
253 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 865 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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federal common law.254 Plaintiffs were initially pleased with the turn towards
domestic law because it seemed to offer greater flexibility and a better rule
on aiding and abetting liability in particular.255 But every step down this
path brought alien tort cases closer to the possibility that courts would apply
the doctrines traditionally used to limit the extraterritorial scope of substantive U.S. law to the ATS. That is what happened in Kiobel.
It is impossible to tell what the future course of human rights litigation
in U.S. courts may be. Kiobel leaves open the possibilities of suits against U.S.
corporations and traditional Filartiga-type suits against individuals.256 Some
have predicted a new wave of human rights litigation in state courts, perhaps
on a transitory tort model.257 But it is possible to tell with the benefit of
hindsight (and perhaps with a sigh) that over the past three decades alien
tort litigation took the road less travelled by. “And that has made all the
difference.”258

254 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
255 See supra notes 196–214 and accompanying text.
256 See, e.g., Doug Cassel, Suing Americans for Human Rights Torts Overseas: The Supreme
Court Leaves the Door Open, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1773 (2014); Ralph G. Steinhardt,
Kiobel and the Multiple Futures of Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations, 28 MD. J.
INT’L L. 1, 22–23 (2013); Beth Stephens, Extraterritoriality and Human Rights After Kiobel, 28
MD. J. INT’L L. 256, 273 (2013).
257 See Borchers, supra note 21, at 48–61; Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 739–52
(2012); Paul Hoffman & Beth Stephens, International Human Rights Cases Under State Law
and in State Courts, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 9, 17–22 (2013); Chimène I. Keitner, State Courts
and Transitory Torts in Transnational Human Rights Cases, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 81, 83–87
(2013); Christopher A. Whytock et al., Forward: After Kiobel—International Human Rights
Litigation in State Courts and Under State Law, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 5–7 (2013).
258 FROST, supra note 9, at 9.
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